In order to provide secure remote access control, a robust and efficient authentication protocol should realize mutual authentication and session key agreement between clients and the remote server over public channels. Recently, Chun-Ta Li proposed a password authentication and user anonymity protocol by using smart cards, and they claimed that their protocol has satisfied all criteria required by remote authentication. However, we have found that his protocol cannot provide mutual authentication between clients and the remote server. To realize 'real' mutual authentication, we propose a two-factor remote authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography in this paper, which not only satisfies the criteria but also bears low computational cost. Detailed analysis shows our proposed protocol is secure and more suitable for practical application.
G U H E D    in a smart card and delivers this smart card to the user A in a secure channel.
Step R3: The user A stores A r in the smart card. Then the smart card contains { , , , ( ), ( ), ( )}
Password authentication phase
When a client A wishes to login to the server S, the client A has to insert its smart card into the card reader and type its identity A ID and password A pw . And then the smart card and the server S perform the following steps：
Step A1:
A S ID E ID R W U 
The smart card selects a random integer Step A2: ' After finishing the password authentication phase, the verifier table is updated.
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Password authentication phase
When a client A wants to change its password, A must notify the server S to update the old password Step P1:
A S ID E ID R W U 
Step P2:
Step P3:
Step P4:
Session key distribution phase
The client A and the server S choose two random numbers , [1, 1] Step S1:
A S ID E ID R W U 
Step S2:
Step S3:
A S ID H W W U SK 
Step S4:
In this section, we demonstrate that the protocol proposed by Chun-Ta Li [17] cannot provide mutual authentication between the clients and the remote server.
provided by Chun-Ta Li [17] is not correct. Even if the client is a legal client, she or he cannot pass the verification of the server S. Under this case, the server S will not send any message to the legal client and will reject the legal client's login request.
Moreover, since the extended protocol with user anonymity provided by Chun-Ta Li is based on the protocol described above, the extended protocol also cannot provide mutual authentication.
According to above analysis, the protocols proposed by Chun-Ta Li cannot provide mutual authentication between clients and the server.
OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section presents our newly designed two-factor (password, smart card) authentication key agreement protocol with user anonymity. The proposed protocol consists of five phases: system setup phase, registration phase, pre-computation phase, authentication phase and password changing phase.
The procedures of the proposed protocol are described in detail as follows (as shown in Fig. 2 ):
System setup phase
Step S1: The server S chooses an elliptic curve equation Step S3: The server S keeps s secret and publishes the public information{ ( , ), , (
p pub E a b P P h  .
Registration phase
When the clientU wants to register with the server S, it performs the following steps with the server S.
Step R1:
The client U selects its password PW and identity ID freely and chooses a random integer
Next, the client U computes ( ) h PW r  and sends { , ( )} ID h PW r  to the server S over a secure channel.
Step R2: After receiving the message from the client U, the server S computes the secret information (
s R E h PW r ID   for the clientU . Then the server S records ID in an identity table as shown in Table 1 which consists of two columns one is for storing the client's ID and the other Status is used for checking whether the login ID is registered, revoked or not. Next it stores R in the memory of a smart card and delivers the smart card to the client U in a secure manner.
Step R3: Upon receiving the smart card, the client U stores the secret random integer r in the smart card.
Then the memory of the smart card contains ( , ) R r . The client U keeps the password , PW ID and the smart card secretly for the registration process. 
Authentication phase
In the authentication phase, the smart card and the server S perform the following four steps.
Step A1: is an encryption function with the x-coordinate of elliptic curve pointV . Finally, it sends ( , ) W Z to the server S.
Step A2:
After receiving the message, the server S computes Step A4: After receiving the response message, the server S verifies whether the following equation 
Decrypt R by using s Password Change Phase:
Decrypt Z by using 
)
and N to the server S.
Step P2: After receiving the message, the server S uses the session key SK to decrypt the encryption message and verifies whether the authentication tag 
Otherwise, it rejects the password changing requirement.
Step P3: Upon receiving the message, the client U decrypts the message and verifies whether the authentication tag
stops the password updating.
SECURITY ANALYSIS

Authentication proof based on Gong-Needham-Yahalom logic
In this section, first we introduce some formulae and statements that will be used in the GongNeedham-Yahalom (GNY) logic; and then set the goals and list the assumptions of the protocol; finally we use the GNY logic to prove our proposed protocol. GNY logic has been widely used to formally analyze the completeness of authentication protocols. It has successfully found defects in several protocols and disclosed redundancies in many protocols. So in this paper, we adopt the GNY logic to evaluate the security of the proposed protocol.
Formulae and statements
A formula is a name used to refer to a bit string, which has a particular value in a run [20] . Let X and Y range over formulae. First we introduce some formulae used in our authentication proof and the complete list of all logical postulates is shown in [20] .
(1) (X, Y): conjunction of two formulae X and Y.
(2) {X}K and 1 { } K X  : symmetrically encrypt and decrypt X with the key K.
(4) h(X): a one-way function of X.
(5) *X: X is not originated here.
A basic statement reflects some property of a formula [20] . Let P and Q range over principals. Then we introduce some statements as follows:
(1) P X < : P is told formula X.
(2) P X  : P possesses formula X.
(2)P X : P once conveyed formula X.
S P Q   : P believes that S is a suitable secret for P and Q.
Protocol description
We first change some notations to fit the GNY logic and transform our protocol into the form of P→ Q:(X). In the following transformation, the notation x_V is regarded as co x V  in our protocol.
(1)
Goals
We descript our goals as follows:
(1) Message content authentication Goal 1: S believes that the message in the first run is recognizable.
Goal 2: U believes that the message in the second run is recognizable.
Goal 3: S believes that the message in the third run is recognizable.
Message origin authentication Goal 4: U believes S conveyed the message in the second run.
Goal 5: S believes U conveyed the message in the third run.
Session key material establishment Goal 6: U believes that S believes that r2 is a secret shared between U and S.
SK U S U S   
Goal 7: U believes that r2 is a secret shared between U and S. 
Assumption list
To derive our goals, some assumptions are made as follows:
S possesses the secret key s.
S s  (2)
Since S keeps the identity table, S believes that ID is recognizable.
The random integer r1 and r are generated by U in the protocol, so U possesses r1 and r. The password PW and ID are chosen by U in the protocol and are keep secret, therefore U possesses PW and ID and believes that ID is fresh. Moreover, the point P is public, and then U possesses P.
is a suitable secret for himself and S.
The SK generated by S is a temporal session key in the current run. So we assume that S believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and S.
The random integer r2 and r3 are generated by S in the protocol, so S possesses r2, r3 and believes that r2 and r3 are fresh.
U believes that the server S is an authority on generating a suitable session key material SK shared between U and S.
SK U S U S   
Authentication proof by using Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic
In this subsection, we use the GNY logic to analyze the proposed protocol. A complete list of all logical postulates and the index in the list is provided [20] , such as (T1, P1), to show how to achieve the goals defined in subsection 5.1.3.
(1) The first run:
S h PW ID r rsP S s S x h PW ID r rP
If S is told a formula 
If S believes that ID is recognizable (Assumption 2) and possesses the secret key s (Assumption 1), then S believes that the encrypted message { ( ), } s h PW r ID  with ID as a component in it, is recognizable. So, S can recognize the secret (
s R E h PW r ID   in the smart card of the client U.
If S believes that R is recognizable (A2) and possesses the key x_V (A1), then S believes that the
According to A4, in the proposed protocol, the server S can recognize the message 
U PW U ID U r U h PW ID r U h PW r ID U h h PW r ID
If U possesses PW, ID and r (Assumption 3), it is capable of possessing (
If U possesses ( ) h PW ID r   (A5), P and r1 (Assumption 3), it is capable of possessing x_V.
If U possesses x_V (A6), then U is entitled to believe that (x_V, r3) is recognizable.
If U believes that (x_V, r3) is recognizable (A7) and U possesses (x_V, r3) (P2, since U is told r3 and possesses x_V (A6), then it possesses (x_V, r3)), then U is entitled to believe that 
If U believes that the formula Auths (8) So, according to (9) we can say that in the proposed protocol, U can recognize the message 
If U believes that ID (Assumption 3) is fresh then it believes that ( )
#{ , } h h PW r ID U Auths U h h PW r ID U h h PW r ID
If U believes that the formula Auths is recognizable (8) , of which Auths is a component, is fresh. Therefore, U can identify that the message in the second run of the proposed protocol is fresh.
h
h PW r ID h h PW r ID h h PW r ID U Auths r U h h PW r ID U U S U Auths r U h h PW r ID U S Auths r U S h h PW r ID
If all of the following conditions hold: 1) U receives the formula (Auths, r2) encrypted with the key
and marked with a not-originated-here mark; 2) U possesses
is a suitable secret for himself and S (Assumption 4); 4) U believes that the formula (Auths, r2) is recognizable (9); and 5) U believes that
Then U is entitled to believe that 1) S once conveyed (Auths, r2) encrypted with ( ( ) ) h h PW r ID   and 2) U believes that the server S possesses ( (
According to the GNY logic, we assume that * U S S    , that is, U believes that S is honest and competent, and then we can deduce the following statement:
SK h h PW r ID h h PW r ID
SK U S S U S Auths r S U S U Auths r U S U S
If U believes that S is honest and competent; and U receives a message According to (13) , U believes that S believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and S. (Goal 6) ,
SK SK
SK U S U S U S U S U U S
If U believes that S is an authority on the statement According to (14) , U believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and S. 
If S possesses r2 (Assumption 6) then it believes that r2 is recognizable, and (x_V, r2) is recognizable. 
If S believes that (x_V, r2) is recognizable (15) and it also possesses (x_V, r2), then S believes that h(x_V, r2) is recognizable. 
If S possesses x_V (A1) and r2 (Assumption 2), it is capable of possessing (x_V, r2), and so it is capable of possessing
If S possesses SK (A18) and r3 (Assumption 6), then it is capable of possessing ((r3+1), SK).
If S believes r2 is fresh (Assumption 6) then it is entitled to believe that SK is fresh. 
If all of the following conditions hold: 1) S receives a formula According to (21) , we can say that S believes that the message Authu in the third run of the proposed protocol is conveyed from the U.
If S believes that U is honest and competent, and S receives a message~S According to (23) , we can say that in the proposed protocol, S believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and S.
(Goal 9)
Discussion on possible attacks
Replay attacks
Supposing that an adversary Bob intercepts the client U's previous message (W, Z) in
Step A1 and replays it to the server S to impersonate the client U. However, in
Step A3，Bob cannot construct a valid Authu to pass the verification process of the server S unless he can correctly guess the session Step A4. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the replay attacks.
Man-in-the-middle attacks
In the proposed protocol, a session key SK can be shared only after mutual authentication between the client U and the server S. So, if an adversary Bob attempts to make the server S believe that it is talking to the client U, he need to pass the verification process of the server S. But Bob cannot pass the verification without the knowledge of the client U's password, client's identifier ID and the secret random integer r. On the other hand, for the same reason, Bob cannot construct a valid Auths to pass the verification process of the client U. So, Bob cannot cheat the client U to share a session key and make the client U believe that the key is shared with the server S. Therefore, Bob cannot launch the man-inmiddle attack to cheat either the client U or the server S.
Impersonation attacks
Assuming an adversary Bob sends a fraud message (W', Z') to the server S to impersonate the client.
But, Bob cannot construct a valid R without the knowledge of the server's secret key s. Therefore, the server S can easily find this attack by comparing the value of the ID in Z with that of the ID in R.
Moreover, the server S can also detect this attack by checking whether the value ( ) h PW r  in Z is equal to the value ( ) h PW r  getting from R.
Supposing an adversary Bob modifies the message (X', r3') and sends it to the client U to impersonate the server S. But Bob cannot correctly guess the decryption key ( ( ) ) h h PW r ID   and construct a valid authentication message Auths to pass the verification process of the client U. Therefore the client U can easily detect the attack by checking whether the equation If an adversary Bob forges an authentication message Authu' and sends it to the server S to impersonate the client U. The server S can find out that Authu' is not equivalent to its computed value, since Bob cannot correctly guess the value of SK without the knowledge of the client U's password PW, identity ID and the secret random integer (r, r1) or the server's secret key s. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the modification attacks.
Stolen-verifier attacks
In the proposed protocol, no password or verification tables are stored on the server S. Therefore, the protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attacks.
Offline dictionary attacks without the smart card
Suppose an adversary intercepts all messages relay between the client U and the server S through eavesdropping communications and then carrying out the offline dictionary attack. In order to obtain the client U's password PW , Bob needs to extract (
which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Even if Bob can obtain the value ( ) h PW ID r   , he cannot correctly guess the client U's password, since the entropy of the secret random integer r is very large. So Bob cannot launch the offline dictionary attack by using the intercepted message W. Furthermore, since the client U's password PW is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm and a high entropy random integer r, so Bob cannot derive it from the information Z, X or Authu. Therefore, the proposed protocol can withstand against the offline dictionary attack without the smart card.
Offline dictionary attacks with the smart card
Assuming an adversary Bob compromises the secret information (R, r) stored in the smart card of the client U and intercepts all the messages transmitted between the client U and the server U. Compared with the offline dictionary attack without the smart card, the addition information known by Bob in this attack is (R, r). However, without the knowledge of the server's secret key s, Bob cannot obtain ( ) h PW r  from R and know whether each of their guessed passwords is correct or not. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the offline dictionary attack with the smart card.
Insider Attacks
In the proposed protocol, the server S needs not to store a password or verification table, so a privileged-insider of the server S cannot access other servers by stealing the identity and passwordverifier from the server S's verification table. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the insider attacks.
Many logged-in users' attacks
Assuming that the client U's password PW and the identity ID are leaked to more than one adversary.
At this case, when adversaries try to login the server S using the client U's password and identity at the same time, the server S will find the attacks by checking the client U's login status Status stored in the identity table. Therefore, the adversaries cannot launch many logged-in users' attacks successfully.
Password disclosure attacks
In our protocol, in the register phase, the client U sends ( ) h PW r  instead of its password to the server S, since the password is protected by a high entropy random integer r chosen by the client U and keep secret, so the server S cannot find an opportunity to obtain the client's password in the register phase.
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the password disclosure attacks.
Provide session key security
In the proposed protocol, only the client U and the server S can compute the session key 1 1 _2 (( which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Furthermore, Bob cannot correctly guess the random integer r2 without the knowledge of the client's password PW, the client's identifier ID and a secret random integer r or the server's secret key s. So, the session key SK is not known by anyone but only the client U and the server S. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides session key security.
Provide known-key security
In the proposed protocol, the session key SK of each session is not connected with the session keys of any other sessions, since the random numbers r1and r2 generated independently by the client U and the server S are different in each session process. Even if the adversary Bob compromises a session key SK, he cannot compute other session keys
. This is because the high entropy random integers ' 1 r and ' 2 r are differ in every session. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides the known-key security.
Provide perfect forward secrecy
In the proposed protocol, the long-term private key of the client U is its password PW. Supposing that the adversary Bob compromises the client's password PW and intercepts all messages relays between the client U and the server S. But knowing above information is not enough for computing a previous session key SK, because Bob cannot correctly guess the valid random integer r2 and compute a integer r. Therefore, in the proposed protocol, even if the client's password PW is compromised, the secrecy of previous session keys established by them cannot be affected.
Provide mutual authentication
In the proposed protocol, the server S and the client U authenticate each other by checking Authu and Auths, respectively. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide mutual authentication.
Provide security in choosing and updating passwords
In order to helps users to remember their own passwords, the legitimate clients with the smartcards can freely choose their favorite passwords in the proposed protocol. Furthermore, an update password phase for users to change their password is also provided in the proposed protocol. Even if the smart card has lost or has been stolen, any other person cannot change or update the password, since they do not know the current session key SK shared between the client U and the server S.
Provide user anonymity
In the proposed protocol, the anonymity of the client U is obtained by hash function, symmetric encryption technique and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In the proposed protocol, the client's identifier ID is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm, elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So, even if an adversary Bob compromises the secret ( , ) R r stored in the smartcard and record the used messages transmitted between the client U and the server S, he cannot derive the real identifier ID of the client without the knowledge of secret key s.
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first evaluate the security and summarize the functionality of our protocol, and then compare the computational cost of our protocol with other related protocols.
As shown in Table 2 , compared with [17] and [18] , our proposed protocol can provide more unique features such as user anonymity and no password or verifier table. These new features are very important in implementing a practical and universal authenticated key agreement. Moreover, Table 2 also shows that the proposed protocol is more robust and secure than other related protocols. In the proposed protocol, since the server does not need to store any password table, the adversary cannot launch the stolen-password attack and the server spoofing attack successfully. The proposed protocol can also resist the attacks associated with client's identity, because the client's real identity ID is protected by hash function, symmetric encryption technique and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, so the adversary cannot guess the client's real identity correctly. In addition, the proposed protocol is secure against other attacks mentioned in Section 5, such as the password disclosure attack, the insider attack, the impersonation attack, the many logged-in users' attack, the stolen smartcard attack, et al. Table 2 . Security and functionality comparisons between our protocol and other protocols Next, we discuss the computational costs of the proposed protocol in each phase. In the registration phase, one hash operations is required to compute ( ) h PW r  on the client side, and one symmetric key encryption operation is needed to obtain R on the server side. In the authentication phase, the client Table 3 , shows that our proposed protocol is more efficient than Islam-Biswas's protocol [18] and Chun-Ta's protocol [17] , because it eliminates the expansive operation bilinear pairing operations and reduces the numbers of the operations of scalar multiplication of elliptic curve. From above discussion, we can conclude that our proposed protocol not only satisfies all the criteria required by mutual authentication and key agreement protocol, but also reduces the computational cost to an extent.
CONCULSION
In this paper, we have found that Chun-Ta Li's protocol cannot provide mutual authentication between the client and the server, and then we have proposed a robust and efficient authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography by using the password and the smart card. The proposed protocol satisfies all the criteria aforementioned which are very important for mutual authentication and key agreement by using the password and the smart card. The security analysis has proved the proposed protocol can resist all possible attacks, and the performance analysis has shown that our protocol achieves better performance that other related protocols. So the proposed protocol is more suitable for practical application. 
